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[ntraduction In the context of macro-economic stabilization in India Iond many other countries, -fiscal deficit" has become an important lariable and policy target. Reduction of the relative size of :he fiscal deficit has been postulated as a basic objective of Jolicy. Until the mid-eighties, in Indian discussions of fiscal ~olicy, attention was focused mostly on the so-called overall )udgetary deficit, or -deficit financing", which was equal to the withdrawal of cash balances and sale of short-term treasury )ills, mostly to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The deficit Deasured thus was taken to represent the creation of fresh credit Jr reserve money. Officials of the Finance Ministry and government' tconomists succeeded in convincing the public that that was the only oype of deficit to worry about because the inflationary impact
of' 'J:he budget w'Qulc'l. depend mainly on it (although it did not, strlrctly speaki .. g. ev~., equal RBI credit to the Government). On the ,other hand, i"l the,.onited States and several other industrialised nations ,,(as also in "developing countries following' U.S. budgetary pra"tices L the "coneel>t of the budqet deficit that was (and is) generally l!mployed for analytical purposes has been the overall defic!¢ taken to equal the difference between total government expendit-ure a"'d~._..eurrent revenues. This is also referred to as fiscal defici.t, , This measure of deficit has been adopted by the IMP as the main policy target in their'"'Proqrammes.
Since the excess of expenditure over revenues would have to be covered by borrowing, the fiscal deficit can be said to be the same as net borrowing by the government. If this is positive, there will be an equivalent addition' to -public detb .. , Thus, we have the identity Fiscal deficit ; net borrowinq by the government ; net addition to public debt.
Two important questions to be raised, before we discuss the analytical usefulness of this concept, are:
a)
How should revenues and expenditures be defined for measuring fiscal deficit? and, b) Whose deficit should one be trying to measure?
Definition of Revenues and Bxpenditures
The general pa'ractice is to include in revenues all "current" receipts into the budget which do not in any way increase the financial liabilities of the government. Thus, all foreign grants are included in the revenues along with tax and non-tax revenues as traditionally defined. It is a moot point whether the proceed,. of the sale of assets owned by the government should be includec in revenues (above the line). The answer will depend upon tho purpose for which the measure is to be used. If the short-tera impact of the budget on aggregate demand through net borrowin~ is to be judged I the sale proceeds of assets could be includec in revenues. Alternatively, the proceeds could be netted against capital formation expenditure. In either case, the sale proceed! will not form part of financing the deficit. However, if one wishell! to measure the extent of fiscal correction or adjustment, in ! situation where the size of the fiscal deficit has been judgec to be too high, it would seem appropriate to consider the reductio., in deficit without taking into account the yield, from the sal. of assets. For this purpose, the sale proceeds should be taken to be an item financing capital expenditure.
On the expenditure side, it is clear that all real expenditure. (i .e., expenditures on goods and services) as well as transfers, out of the Consolidated Fund of India (including out of special funds under the control of the government) should be included. A question is sometimes raised whether lending or financial investment by the government should be included. Instead, should it not be netted against net borrowing? The case for this latter procedure rests on the argument that in so far as borrowed money is re-Ient by the government, it is only acting as an intermediary and· such lending does no~ add to aggregate demand.. (Corresponding ESSAY ON FISCAL DEFICIT to the net lending by the government, there will be private investment which is included in private expenditure in the National Accounts). It is true that in the preparation of National Accounts, net lending by the government cannot be treated as part of government expenditure. But it cannot bereadily assumed that lending by the government would not lead to an increase in aggregate demand, because the lending may be financed by government borrowing from the banks, from RBI or from abroad. It is, therefore, preferable to include net lending in government expenditure for measuring fiscal deficit. !! If one is interested in finding out the short-term macro"'economic impact of the budget, it seems proper to start with the magnitude of Government's net borrowing, as defined above. Not that it is a perfect measure of the expansionary impact of the budget. Its limitations and by what other measures it must be supplemented will be considered later in this paper. Meanwhile, let us turn to the question of coverage.
It is generally argued that one should measure and consider the -fiscal n deficit of the public sector as a whole and not just that of the government sector and that 1n the government sector, all levels of government should be considered. The second proposition is readily granted: If one is talking of the government sector's deficit, one should take the consolidated fiscal deficit of all levels of government, avoiding double counting. It should be mentioned, however, that if sub-national governments have independent powers of borrowing, it would not be possible for the Federal or Central Government to control directly the total government sector deficit. For purposes of macro-economic stabilisation, credit to the sub-national governments will have to be controlled through monetary policy instruments just as credit to the private sector will be. Multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF have to negotiate only on the basis of the fiscal deficit of the Central Government.
However, for analytical purposes, there is a strong case for taking the deficit of the public sector as a whole because in many countries public enterprises are under the effective control of the government and are allowed to borrow on favourable terms. Explicit or implicit guarantee by the government is present in respect of borrowing by the public enterprises. Hence, it is argued that there is not much difference between the government I s borrowing and re-lending to the enterprises and the enterprises' borrowing directly. This is by and large· true in India in respect of enterprises which are not really autonomous and which de~end at least partly on government allocated borrowings. However, one needs to be cautious not to extend the coverage too widely such that the resulting measure of deficit cannot be employed for any useful analytical or policy purposes. One has to remember that one is dealing with fiscal policy.
Earlier, I had referred to the question of defining fiscal deficit in terms of exclusion or inclusion of different items of receipts and expenditure. There could be minor differences of opinion here, but a broad consensus has emerged in the context of judging the impact of the budget. Prof. Anand P. Gupta, however, has put forward a rather novel view. In a recent article 2/ he has' stated: "Our thinking on the issue is that all expenditures, including even gross lending, gross acquisition of financial assets, and retirement of debt ought to be taken into account for calculating a country's public sector deficit, with capital receipts on account 
Li.itations of the Concept of Fiscal Deficit
We shall accept the traditional IMF-type definition of fiscal deficit and now turn to a discussion of its limitations.
a)
The use of the overall budgetary balance or the fiscal deficit to measure the expansionary· impact of the public sector budget implies that a rupee of every type of expenditure will have an equivalent effect, i.e., one rupee of expansionary impact on demand and that similarly a rupee of every type of "above-the-line" revenue will have a rupee of deflationary impact or curtail private demand by a rupee. This would mean that the balanced budget multiplier will be zero. This is of course not true. In the case of transfer payments, ~or example, the impact will be a proportion of the transfer equal to the amount of transfer multiplied by the marginal propensity to consume of the recipient.
In the case of goods expenditure, the impact will be 1:1. Income tax payment will reduce demand only to the extent of the payment multiplied by the marginal propensity to consume of the income tax payer; and so on. The extreme case is that of a foreign grant which will have no negative impact on domestic demand at all. Similarly, expenditure abroad will have no expansionary impact on domestic demand but will add to the demand for foreign exchange, and to that extent can be said to have an expansionary impact.
In fact, it may be useful to derive a budget balance and then supplement it by drawing domestic and foreign balances. Thus, if the budget balance can be shown as :
1. Subject to the limitations mentioned earlier regarding the non-weighted character of the budget balance, the domestic balance may be said to indicate the expansionary impact on domestic demand and the foreign balanc~ the impact on the balance of payments.
•

Receipts
The fiscal deficit taken as a whole may be said to indicate the total macro-economic impact. It should be added that the domestic balance indirectly also affects the balance of payments through its imoact on domestic demand.
The second limitation of the fiscal deficit as a target variable is that it is an endogenous variable. Given the level of public expenditure, it varies with the level of national income which determines the level of revenue under a given tax structure. In a sense, therefore, the government cannot fully control it. Also, it is not easy to determine the porper magnitude of fiscal adjustment which a country needs to undertake. If too large a cut in the actual deficit is attempted income may further fall. What is sometimes suggested is that given the revenue structure, expenditure should be adjusted so as to result in a hypothetical balance (i.e., nil deficit) under conditions of full employment, that is to say, taking credit for revenues that would arise under conditions of -full employment. Dr. Vito Tanzi believes that this limitation does not have much relevance for developing countries. 3/ This is presumably because the developing countries are not subject to recession due to deficiency in domestic effective demand.
The ·third limitation of the concept of fiscal deficit is that although it is a broad indicator of the budget impact on the current account deficit of the balance of payments, it cannot be taken to accurately reflect the impact on domestic demand even if only the domestic balance part of it is considered. This is because the different sources of financing the deficit -RBI credit, borrowing from the commercial banks, borrowing from households, foreign financing and so on have different effects on demand, with RBI credit having the most expansionary effect. Hence, the impact of a given volume of deficit will depend upon the composition of its financing and cannot, therefore, be easily quantified. It is for these reasons that in India and in some other countries, greater attention has been devoted to RBI credit to government or what is called monetised deficit.
Fiscal Adjust.eDt and ~pes of Deficits to be Considered
In bringing about fiscal adjustment or. in other words.
restoring fiscal balance, three types of deficit need to be considered. The first is the fiscal deficit. In spite of many limitations discussed above, the fiscal deficit is still looked upon as the best available summary indicator of the macro _economic impact of the Budget. It is necessary to monitor and regulate the fiscal deficit for two other important reasons also. One reason is the government I s borrowing tends to crowd out private investment, thereby introducing distortions in the allocation of resources. Furthermore, if government borrowing is used for relatively non-productive purposes. such as for covering a short-fall in the current account of the Budget, increased government borrowing will mean dis~lacement of capital formation in the economy leading to a lower rate of growth.
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The other reason for attaching importance to fiscal deficit is that net borrowing by the government adds to public debt. While an increase in the volume of public debt in itself need not cause great concern, a fast growth of public debt would. result in an increasing debt/GDP ratio which, after a point, would have very harmful· consequences.
The second type of deficit that needs to be considered is the revenue deficit, which is defined as the difference between revenue expenditures (i .. e.o, broadly government expendi tures not leading to capital formation) and current rcevenues. Thus, a revenue deficit arises if the revenue expenditures exceed current revenues. The division of expenditure into revenu~ and capital, as shown in the Budget, does not strictly correspond to the division between current expenditure and capital expenditure as defined in the National Accounts. If the budgetary expenditures are re-classified into current and capital, we would be able to .derive a measure of government IS saving or dis-saving.
Many economists, particularly those in the United States, do not favour the division of the Budget into current and capital. They believe that such a· division gives a wrong· impression that capital expenditure will lead to growth and can, therefore, be financed by borrowing and that current expenditure must necessarily be financed by current revenues •. For eX8-mple, Vito Tan.zi has argued that the concept of revenue deficit is seriously flawed 41. The arguments he gives to support his view, however, are untenable. His· first a-rgument is that nwhether a government spends on current expenditure or ·on investment I the short-term effect of the expenditure on the country's balance -of payments will be the same" and that, therefore, the distinction made between current and capi tal and deri vat ion of a balance on -government I s current account is of no use. Tanzi misses the point that the revenue deficit measure is not to be used to judge the impact on balance of payment or on domestic demand.. It is meant to find out if ·the recurrent expenditure of the government on account of public consumption and current transfers are fully met out of current revenues.. It is well accepted in public finance theory that the cost of public goods should be defrayed out of taxes levied on the population consuming those goods. Of course, some lumpy types of expenditure and part of the current expenditure that might lead to future benefits such as those on education and health could be met out of borrowing. However; it is essential to insist; particularl~ in developing countries, that current expenditures should be mostl'Y met' out of current revenues to ensure fiscal discipline. Secondly, measuring saving on government account does not necessarily imply that saving is contributing to 'economic growth as Tanzi seeme to argue; National Accountants who measure savings are not insisting or implying that the savings necessarily lead to growth. In an,! case, without measuring saving or dis-saving on government account, how could one measure National Savings? ~/ Thirdly, ignoring or rajecting the concept, of, the revenUE deficit could lead to serIOUS consequences In conditions of government finances prevailing in India .. At the level of the Central Government,' a large portion of Government's net borrowing,' about 48 per cent, is now used to finance the revenue deficit. At the same time, the programme of fiscal adjustment requires that the fiscal deficit be cut.· If the revenue deficit is not reduced, the reduction in the fiscal deficit can only come about through a cut in Government's capital formation which will be injurious to growth. Tanzi is, of course, right in saying that current expenditures on health and education are as important as capital expenditure and that' on the other hand capital formation on government account could be devoted to unproductive projects t but government eapital formation on infrastrueture, on sehools and hospitals, etc., is vital-for growth and welfare. In the course of fiscal adjustment such expenditure should be protected. In fact, IMF officials have frowned upon the Government of India trying to reduce the fiscal defieit through mostly cutting down capital formation. Thus, implicitly at least, they are asking for a reduction in the revenue deficit.
In developing countries, at any rate, it is. desirable to postulate a rule that only a s"mall portion of government's revenue expenditure, ~ainly that relating to the provision of additional services in such sectors as education and health could be covered by government borr,owing. '
The third type of deficit which is important from ,the policy point of view is the monitised deficit, namely, RBI credit to Government. The overall budgetary deficit derived in the Budget does not accucately reflect the size of the 'monitised deficit. In recent years, the Ministry of Finance' has been mentioning the size of the RBI credit to Government as a memorandum item. The monitised deficit indicates the amount of ereation. of additional money owing to the credit extended to governme.nt. There is justification for attaching special importance to the regulation and, if necessary, reduction of the monitised deficit for controlling inflationary ,pressures..
The volume of such deficit, which is ,sometimes called seignorage"
should not exceed the amount needed to meet the extra demand for cash arising due to grwoth under reasonably stable conditions. One question that has been raised in this connection is How should RBI credit to Government during a given year be measured? The Government's budget would only show the addi,tional credit outstanding on the 31st of March of the year. This figure could be misleading if some (artificial means are employed to bring down the credit outstanding for a short period at the end of the year. Therefore, instead of the end-year level, an average level of credit sU'Ch as the average credit outstanding at the end of every week could be used.
In the book, How to Measure the Fiscal Deficit? cited earlier, Mario I. Blejer and Adrienne Cheasty have indica'ted the methodology of measuring another kind of deficit" which could be of relevance in the longer-term eontext, if ehanges in government's net worth are considered of importance. In an article entitled "The Deficit as an Indi,cator of Government's Solvency -Changes in Public Sector Net Worth", the authors point out that a government's ability to pay will be affected by, changes in the value of its assets and liabilities as well as by inflation, currency devaluation and change in its terms of trade. Therefore, the authors ~rgue, it is necessary to take another fiscal deficit measure which will be -an indicator of the long-run sustainability of government". This measure of fiscal deficit would be equivalent to the dis-saving of the government or public sector as an entity, i.e., reduction in its net worth, (this would be different from government saving or dis-saving as measured in National Accounts). In order to compute the change in government's net worth, it would be necessary to take into account changes in all its assets and liabilities including programmes. It would be an enormous undertaking to compute the change in net worth of the public sector as a whole. Furthermore, the net worth of the government as an entity by itself is not of any great significance. Solvency of the government is of course a matter of great importance. However, solvency 'conditions can be radically altered by tax increases. It would seem that for the present that we, in India, should concentrate on the three measures of deficit indicated earlier, namely, over-all fiscal deficit, the revenue deficit and monetised deficit.
Fiscal Deficit and the Growth of Public Debt
As already pointed out I the fiscal deficit derives its analytical importance from its short-term impact on demand and on balance of payments as weil as from the fact that it adds to public debt. A large fiscal deficit also has allocational implications in so far as it tends to crowd out private investment.
Government borrowing increasing faster than GDP, i.e., a rising ratio of government's domestic borrowing to GOP leads to a falling proportion of domestic savings available to be used by the private sector if the rate of saving does not increase. Additionally, even though government may pre-empt savings through special provisions, such as the statutory liquidity ratio in India, increasing government borrowing tends to lead to a rise in the rate of interest which in turn affects the growth rate.
Professor Gulati 6/ has recently argued that the concentration on fiscal deficit and the growth of debt does not reflect a proper policy stance. His arguments to support the above proposition are two-fold: first, if, as Damar had suggested in the '405, national income grows fast, there will be no problem in meeting the interest charges on public debt. The implication is that we should be bothered more about increasing the rate of growth than about the growth of debt.. The second argument is that it is the tardy growth in tax revenues and the low rate of recovery in the form of interest receipts and dividends accruing to the Government that are responsible for the interest payments by the Government absorbing a larger and larger proportion of its revenues.
As regards Gulati's first argument, it should be pointed out that Domar was writing in the heyday of Keynesianism when it was assumed that booms and recession could be avoided and continuous growth could be ensured through manipulating government' s fiscal balance. The experience of economic policy making since the 1960s has shown that fiscal policy is by no means as effective in ensuring growth without inflation as it was onc~ believed and maintaining steady growth is not an easy task. The lesson has also been learnt that growth can more easily be attained in conditions of relative macro-economic stability wherein the government IS excess demand does not contribute both to inflationary impulses and the government appropriating a larger and larger share of the nation's resources and savings. In the Indian context, the need to reduce both fiscal deficit and the revenue deficit arises precisely because such steps are needed to contain inflation and to accelerate growth.
It is true that, as Gulati has pointed out, the ratio of net interest payments to government revenues has bee~ steadily rising during the 80's. This is due to the rising proportion of gross interest payments to revenues and the falling proportion of receipts of interest and dividends by the government to its interest outgo. This falling reeovery rate is due not only to the fact that Government I s investments generally are not yielding adequate returns but also because too big a portion of the borrowing is used to cover the revenue deficit (currently around 48 per cent). 7/ It is not clear why Gulati" asks us to be somewhat complacent about the growth of public debt when we all know that ensuring productive investments (without much leakage) out of government's borrowings and reaping adequate returns from public enterprises is amongst the most difficult tasks facing us. Could we rightly ask the State Governments, for e¥ample, not to worry too much about the growth of their debts when we know that they are using part of their borrowing for paying salaries of government servants and that getting even a small return from their Electricity Boards, Road Transport Corporations and I~rigation Works (commercial) is still a far cry? To take his other point, namely, that the growth in government revenues has been tardy, it must be noted that the revenue ratio of the Central and State Governments together rose from 17.5 per cent in 1980-81 to 19.7 per eent in 1991-92, i.e., by 2.2 percentage points. Such a growth cannot be called tardy. Bven if the revenue ratio had risen by 1 percentage point more, the ratio of net interest payments to government revenues would have been too high now. Leaving aside the revenue ratio, if one lo·oks at the rate of growth of revenues during the 180s, one can easily see that the growth rate of revenues was much faster in the 180s because the rate of growth of income was the highest during that decade and revenues grew faster than income (around 16 per cent per annum). It is certainly unjustified to expect the people of India to pay an increasing proportion of GOP in taxes in order to keep pace with the rise in the interest on public debt regardless of the kind of use to which the funds are put. Apart from that, such an increase in-the revenue ratio would be neither desirable from the economy's point of view nor feasible. As I have already indicated, only a small proportion of revenue expenditure should normally be met out of borrowing. !/ Prof. Gulati has further observed "to emphasise reduction in public borrowing in order to reduce the fiscal deficit amounts to shifting the accent of fiscal policy from the mobilisation of current revenue receipts and the productive deployment of government expenditure to blanket reduction of government spending". Since publie bo~rowing and fiseal defieit are one and the same, reducing the one means reducing the other. What Gulati has in mind is really that deficit should be cut more by inereasing revenues than by decreasing government expenditure. I am sure that most of his countrymen will disagree with him on this, although they would grant his point that there is much scope' for increasing government expenditure in essential areas.
Policy prescriptions by his fellow economists like me have not concentrated on blanket reduction in public expenditure. Attention of the government has been drawn to the need for and the possibility of-reducing a wide range of unjustified subsidies, payments to the loss-making" public enterprises and the maintenance of a bloated bureaucracy. If all this is done, the atmosphere would be more conducive for persuading the citizens to pay more taxes. In fact, as far as I can understand, the policy of the Central Government is to make efforts to raise substantial revenues through a rationalised and reformed tax system which can be enforced better.
I have argued that at the present time, policy makers should take steps to reduce and control the fiscal deficit I 'revenue deficit and the monetised deficit. I am not, therefore, advocating that attention should be concentrated on the fiscal deficit. However, in deciding whether the current fiscal policy is rightly focused. we must also consider the short-term impact of the fiscal deficit on demand and balance of payments and how government borrowing has tended to crowd out private investment I leaving only a emaIl proportion of domestic savings for private use. (As of 1990-91, around 81 per cent of gross financial savings of the household sector was absorbed by domestic borrowings of the government sector, as defined in National Accounts.)
Illustrative Projections of Publ~
Debt Profile Table 1 indicates the trends in fiscal deficit at the Centre and for the Central and State Governments taken together. It also shows the results of the efforts made to reduce the fiscal, revenue and the budgetary deficits. The combined fiscal deficit for the Centre and the State had reached around 10 per cent of GOP in 1990-91, while that at the Centre was 8.4 per cent. According to Budget Estimates for 1992-93, the former was to have been brought down to 6.8 per cent and the latter to 4.9 per cent. According to the Revised Estimates, the Centre's fiscal deficit is about 5.6 per cent of GDP. Thus, there has been a slippage of 0.67 percentage point at the Centre. So in 1992-93, the combined fiscal deficit would have been around 7.5 per cent. Contrary to the ,eneral impression, the revenue deficit is also being reduced, though such reduction seems to have been slowed down last year. Tables 2, 3 and 4 contain projections of the growth of the debt ratio, the interest to GOP ratio and the average interest rate, on certain assumptions regarding the rate of growth, the rate of interest on additonal borrowing and the composition of borrowing, and on alternative assumptions regarding the fiscal deficit ratio. The figures in these tables relate to the Central Government only. The fiscal deficit ratio is assumed to be reduced in 1994-95 to 5 per cent, 4 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, in Tables 2, 3 and 4 and is assumed to remain constant thereafter.
The Parameter Table indicates the other assumptions made. The major assumption are that the nominal income grows at 13 per cent per annum (say, a real rate of growth of 6 per cent and price rise of 7 per cent), the interest rate on additiQnal government borrowing goes down to 11 per cent in 1998-99 and to 10 per cent in 2000-01 and the proportions of borrowing from abroad and from RBI to GOP remain more or less the same as now. Under such assumptions, if the fiscal deficit ratio is reduced to 5 per cent in 1994-95, the ratio of interest on government debt to GOP will still remain at 3.78 per cent of GDP in 2002-03 This may be considered. rather high. However, since the rate of growth will be hiqher than the average rate of interest (which will start falling after 1998-99), the debt/GDP ratio will continue to fall. With the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio brought down to 3 per cent in 1994-95 and kept constant at that level, the interest to GOP ratio falls to a more comfortable level of 2.7 per cent by 2002-03 In my view, it is not feasible or even desirable to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP by 1994-95. What I infer from the results presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 is that government should try to bring down the fiscal deficit ratio from 5.6 per cent in 1992-93 to 3 per cent in 2002-03. Fiscal adjustment could be carried out gradually so that there will be no need to cut essential or capital formation expenditure.
One of our crucial assumptions is that the rate of growth (real) will be higher than the real of interest. A 6 per cent growth rate combined with prudent fiscal adjustment should bring the public debt problem under control. !/ Finally, we may consider the question of eliminating the revenue deficit within a period of 10 years or so.. Let us asume that the revenue ratio of the Central Government will continue to grow. For .the purpose of calculating the growth in revenues, the coefficient buoyancy has been worked out on the basis of the data for the last decade, which amounts of 1.144. Table  5 indicate the implicit rate of growth of revenue expenditure, if the revenue deficit is to be eliminated by 2002-03, with the growth in revenues assumed as indicated above. We find that the revenue espenditure could grow at a: rate only slightly below the growth of income. Thus, with satisfactory growth in income, there will be no need for revenue expenditures as a whole to be cut, only its growth is to be controlled. For this purpose, selective reduction in expenditure on certain items would be needed. The lower· the level of fiscal deficit, the lower will be the rate of grwoth of interest expenditure and hence the greater the scope for the growth of other items of expenditure. The programme of pruning the fiscal deficit need not and does not involve any "blanket reductionin public expenditure, not even in revenue expenditure. However, the slower rate of growth of revenue expenditure leading to the elimination of revenue deficit enable a higher level of government capital formation with a given level of fiscal deficit. The growth of the economy requires a certain volume of fiscal deficit and if their levels are properly related, the debt will be under control. At the same time, for growth to take place under stable conditions fiscal deficit cannot be allowed to get out of control.
It is essential to remembp.r this inter-dependence.
The ratios of interest expenditure to revenues under alternative assumptions relating to the fiscal deficit ratio to be maintained from the year 1994-95, as given in Tables 2, 3 For avoiding inflationary pressures, the monetised deficit of the Centre should be limited to the amount requ'ired to create not more than the additional demand for cash balances.
c)
The revenue deficit should be eliminated 'as early as possible: it should in any case be brought down continuously with zero deficit being reached latest by 2002-03. With such reduction, the growth of net interest payments will be cut down in relative terms leaving scope for the growth of other expenditures.
d)
It would be desirable to raise the revenue buoyancy to I. 2 through a reform of the tax system and better enforcement: and
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